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Should States Opt for the Saving Clause 
In the Multilateral Instrument?
by Vikram Chand
The saving clause, found in article 1(4) of the 
U.S. model tax convention,1 provides that treaty 
partners can tax their own residents or citizens in 
accordance with their domestic laws irrespective 
of whether the treaty is in effect. The clause is a 
standard feature of U.S. treaty policy. From a U.S. 
perspective, it reinforces the U.S.’s ability to tax its 
residents and citizens on their worldwide income. 
However, article 1(5) of the U.S. model also 
contains exceptions to the saving clause.2 These 
exceptions ensure that treaty benefits are available 
to residents or citizens. Again taking a U.S. 
perspective, this suggests that the U.S. is restricted 
from applying its domestic law and must apply 
treaty benefits when a situation falls within 
specific exceptions. While it is a U.S. creation, it is 
worth noting that the clause operates on the basis 
of reciprocity. This implies that the clause saves 
the right of both contracting states to tax their own 
residents (or citizens) in accordance with their 
internal laws unless and until an exception 
applies.
In October 20153 the OECD released its final 
deliverable on action 6 of the base erosion and 
profit-shifting project. Along with other 
measures, a saving clause like that in the U.S. 
model (customized to the OECD model) was 
proposed. Article 1(3) provides that:
This Convention shall not affect the 
taxation, by a Contracting State, of its 
residents except with respect to the 
benefits granted under paragraph 3 of 
Article 7, paragraph 2 of Article 9 and 
Articles 19, 20, 23, 24 and 25 and 28.
This provision is also reflected in article 
11(1)(a)-(g) of the OECD’s Multilateral 
Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related 
Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (MLI).4 However, in order to ensure that 
the exceptions reflect existing treaty practice 
(likely, U.S. practice), the MLI added 
subparagraphs (h)5 and (i)6 to address instances 
when the taxpayer is exclusively taxed in the state 
of source. The MLI further broadens the 
exceptions by adding subparagraph (j), which is 
intended to “cover provisions that expressly limit 
taxation rights of the residence jurisdiction or 
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In this article, the author discusses the saving 
clause in the OECD’s multilateral instrument 
and potential problems that may result from its 
application, and concludes that for a majority of 
OECD member states, adopting the clause may 
not be appropriate.
1
U.S. Model Tax Income Tax Convention of February 17, 2016, article 
1(4). The first sentence of the paragraph provides that “Except to the 
extent provided in paragraph 5 of this Article, this Convention shall not 
affect the taxation by a Contracting State of its residents (as determined 
under Article 4 (Resident)) and its citizens.”
2
Id. at article 1(5). The exceptions include, among other provisions, 
article 9(2) (associated enterprises), article 7(3) (business profits), article 
23 (relief from double taxations), article 24 (non-discrimination), and 
several provisions dealing with pensions, alimony, and social security.
3
OECD, “Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate 
Circumstances, Action 6 — 2015 Final Report” (Oct. 5, 2015).
4
OECD, “Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related 
Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (Nov. 24, 2016).
5
This exception provides that pensions or other payments made 
under social security legislation of the source state are taxable only in 
that state.
6
This exception provides that pensions and similar payments, 
annuities, alimony payments, or other maintenance payments arising in 
the state of source are taxable only in that state.
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expressly allow taxation rights exclusively to the 
source jurisdiction.” 7
Notably, the saving clause is optional; states 
may choose whether to opt for its inclusion8 
because it is not a minimum standard. The key 
question addressed in this article is whether states 
that have no experience with this clause should 
opt for the saving clause and notify the depository 
of the MLI accordingly. This article is not intended 
to serve as a detailed analysis of the clause.9
The Reasons for the OECD’s Saving Clause
The OECD’s final report on action 6 
introduced the saving clause as part of its 
discussion about the interaction between specific 
domestic antiavoidance rules and tax treaties.10 
The report argues that the majority of tax treaty 
provisions operate to restrict the taxing rights of 
the source state, as opposed to the taxing rights of 
the state of the taxpayer’s residence. However, in 
limited cases, tax treaties have been interpreted as 
limiting the state of residence’s right to tax its own 
resident taxpayer. The report11 states that this 
latter position should be rejected, referring to 
portions of the OECD commentary on 
partnerships (specifically, paragraph 6.1 of the 
commentary on article 1) and controlled foreign 
company rules (specifically, paragraph 23 of the 
commentary on article 1, and paragraph 14 of the 
commentary on article 7). Nevertheless, the report 
proposes the introduction of the saving clause12 to 
explicitly state that treaty provisions should not 
limit a state’s right to tax its own residents, 
particularly when that state applies “domestic 
anti-abuse rules (as illustrated by the example of 
controlled foreign companies rules)” to its own 
residents.
Is a Saving Clause Useful and Appropriate?
In the context of CFC-type rules, the question 
arises whether the provisions of a tax treaty 
(based on the 2014 OECD model) restrict a state 
(State R) from imputing to its own resident 
taxpayer (a controlling corporation or controlling 
individual, X) the income derived by a controlled 
foreign entity (P) established in another state 
(State P). International organizations,13 namely the 
U.N. and OECD, believe that these domestic 
antiavoidance rules do not conflict with tax 
treaties. Several courts14 and the tax 
administrations of several OECD member states15 
agree. However, a few courts16 and a handful of 
tax administrations argue otherwise.17 Moreover, 
in the context of hybrid entities (which may or 
may not be set up with a tax avoidance purpose), 
a question arises whether the provisions of a tax 
treaty restrict a state (State R) from imputing to its 
own resident taxpayer (partner X) the income 
derived by a foreign opaque partnership (P) 
established in another state (State P). Again, a 
majority18 of OECD member states are of the 
opinion that the domestic rules do not conflict 
with tax treaties. However, the minority argue 
otherwise.19 Since the majority of states perceive 
no conflict between such domestic income 
7
See OECD, “Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Convention 
to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting” (Nov. 24, 2016), para. 150.
8
See id., para. 153.
9
For a detailed analysis, see Georg Kofler, “Some Reflections on the 
‘Saving Clause,’” 44(8/9) Intertax 574-589 (2016).
10
OECD action 6 report, supra note 3, at para. 60.
11
Id. at para. 61.
12
Id. at para. 62.
13
OECD, “Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax 
Convention” (July 15, 2014), article 1, para. 23; article 7, para. 14; article 
10, paras. 37-39. See also U.N., “Commentaries on the Articles of the 
Model Double Tax Convention Between Developed and Developing 
Countries” (2011), article 1, para. 74; article 7, para. 8; and article 10, 
para. 16.
14
For example, see Bricom Holdings Limited v. Inland Revenue 
Commissioners, STC 1179 (CA), Court of Appeal (July 25, 1997) (U.K. 
court interpreting treaty with the Netherlands); Re A Oyj Abp, 
KHO:2002.26, 4 ITLR 1009 (Mar. 20, 2002), pp. 1009-1076 (Finnish court 
interpreting treaty with Belgium); and Glaxo Kabushiki Kaisha v. Director 
of Kojimachi Tax Office, Case No. 2008 (Gyou Hi), 12 ITLR 644 (Oct. 29, 
2009) (Japanese court interpreting treaty with Singapore).
15
See the view of the majority expressed in the OECD, “Double 
Taxation Conventions and the Use of Base Companies,” para. 39 (Nov. 
26, 1986).
16
For example, see Re Société Schneider Electric, CE No. 232276 (June 
28, 2002) (French court interpreting treaty with Switzerland); Eagle 
Distribuidora de Bebidas SA v. Second group of the Revenue Department in 
Brasilia, Ac. 101-97-070 (Dec. 17, 2008) (Brazilian court interpreting treaty 
with Spain).
17
For instance, see the observations to the OECD commentary, supra 
note 13, by Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland on article 1, article 7, and article 10(5).
18
OECD, “The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to 
Partnerships,” para. 127 (discussion in Example 16) and para. 131 
(discussion in Example 17) (Aug. 26, 1999).
19
Id. at para. 126 (discussion in Example 16) and para. 132 (discussion 
in Example 17).
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imputation rules and treaty law, there simply is 
nothing that needs saving. Accordingly, adopting 
the saving clause would not make sense for those 
majority states.
Nevertheless, to avoid specific recurring 
controversies, it may be wise for both the majority 
and the minority to adopt a treaty provision 
clarifying that treaties do not prevent the 
application of CFC-type rules and do not prevent 
the application of residence state income 
attribution rules. The saving clause does achieve 
this purpose. However, its impact also goes 
beyond its stated purpose, which raises several 
concerns.
The Saving Clause and the BEPS Project
First, as a fundamental starting point, I do not 
believe that the saving clause is a treaty antiabuse 
clause akin to the principal purpose test or the 
limitation on benefits clause. The clause preserves 
a state’s right to tax its resident in both “genuine” 
as well as “tax avoidance” situations. Since the 
main objective of action 6 is to ensure that tax 
treaties do not facilitate tax avoidance, one might 
question whether the saving clause belongs in the 
BEPS project, since the clause also preserves the 
right of a state to tax its residents in genuine 
circumstances.
The Saving Clause and the Arm’s-Length Standard
Second, and most important, the arm’s-length 
provision found in article 9(1) of the OECD model 
tax convention is not listed as an exception to the 
saving clause. This could affect those states that 
consider article 9(1) to be a “restrictive” as 
opposed to an “illustrative” provision.20
For example, suppose a company in State R 
(Corp A) sells goods to its associated enterprise 
(Corp B) in State S for $100. However, the arm’s-
length price for this transaction, as determined by 
applying one of the authorized OECD transfer 
pricing methods, is determined to be $120. 
Nevertheless, under its domestic rules for pricing 
transactions with associated enterprises, State R 
considers the sale price for the transaction to be 
$150 (for example, by using a formulary 
apportionment mechanism).21 If article 9(1) is read 
as restrictive, it would permit State R to rewrite 
the accounts of Corp A only up to the arm’s-length 
standard price of $120. However, because article 
9(1) is not excepted from the saving clause, State R 
may not need to apply the arm’s-length standard 
when making primary adjustments, since State R 
can tax its residents in accordance with its internal 
laws. Consequently, the accounts of Corp A could 
be rewritten to $150. The question then becomes 
whether State S should provide a corresponding 
adjustment under article 9(2), which is listed as an 
exception to the saving clause. Article 9(2) 
requires State S to provide an adjustment only 
when State R makes profit adjustments on an 
arm’s-length basis. Since the adjustment is not on 
an arm’s-length basis, State S would not be 
obliged to provide a corresponding adjustment 
(for the non-arm’s-length amount). Ultimately the 
discrepancy means the issue would have to be 
resolved by the mutual agreement procedure in 
article 25.
Further, by not excepting article 9(1), the 
saving clause can also affect the application of 
thin capitalization rules. For example, consider 
the following situation: A company in State R 
(Corp A) funds its associated enterprise (Corp B) 
in State S with an interest-bearing loan. To 
counteract base erosion, State S applies its 
domestic arbitrary fixed debt-equity ratio (for 
instance, 4 to 1), which applies only to associated 
enterprises, and limits the interest deduction for 
Corp B.22 The domestic rule applies even though 
the funding and interest rate are at arm’s length. 
The OECD commentary suggests that some thin 
capitalization rules (such as arbitrary fixed debt-
equity ratio rules) could conflict with article 9(1).23 
20
See OECD, “Thin Capitalization,” para. 50 (Nov. 26, 1986). It is 
debated whether article 9(1) is restrictive or illustrative in its scope. A 
restrictive interpretation of article 9(1) would lead to the conclusion that 
it prohibits the adjustment of profits to an amount exceeding the arm’s-
length amount whereas an illustrative interpretation would lead to the 
conclusion that article 9(1) does not prohibit a country from adjusting 
the profits to an amount exceeding the arm’s-length profit.
21
For instance, the European Commission believes that the common 
consolidated corporate tax base is an “effective tool for attributing 
income to where the value is created, through a formula based on three 
equally weighted factors (i.e. assets, labor, and sales). Since these factors 
are attached to where a company earns its profits, they are more resilient 
to aggressive tax planning practices than the widespread transfer pricing 
methods for allocating profit.” See European Commission, Proposal for a 
Common Corporate Tax Base (2016), at 2.
22
See, e.g., OECD, “Thin Capitalization,” supra note 20, at para. 79.
23
OECD commentary, supra note 13, at article 9, para. 3. See also 2011 
U.N. commentary, supra note 13, at article 1, paras. 69-70.
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Since article 9(1) is not listed as an exception to the 
saving clause, it could be argued that the tax 
treaty should not affect State S’s taxation of its 
own resident (Corp B). Therefore, the saving 
clause opens the door for states to apply non-
arm’s-length thin capitalization rules to associated 
enterprises. But, if the treaty contains the 
deduction nondiscrimination clause (article 24, 
paragraph 4) or the ownership nondiscrimination 
clause (article 24, paragraph 5), and that rule 
applies to nonresidents (or nonresidents that have 
ownership interests in a payer), then the saving 
clause cannot protect the arbitrary fixed ratio rule, 
because article 24 is an exception.24 Notably, some 
OECD member states do not include some 
provisions of the nondiscrimination articles in 
their tax treaties25 or have carved out exceptions 
for interest limitation rules.26 These states, if they 
adopt the saving clause, could deviate from the 
limitations imposed by the arm’s-length standard 
in these circumstances.
The Saving Clause and Hybrid Entities
The saving clause also raises treaty 
interpretation issues for hybrid entities.
Suppose Partner X, a resident of State R, owns 
an interest in a foreign opaque partnership (P) 
established in State P. P derives royalty income 
(taxable only in the state of residence under article 
12 of the P-R tax treaty) from State R. State R 
considers the partnership transparent and 
allocates the royalty income to X while State P 
treats it as a resident entity and allocates the 
income to P. The first question that arises is 
whether P should be entitled to treaty benefits. 
The final report on BEPS action 2 provides an 
answer by suggesting an anti-hybrid treaty 
provision.27 The provision provides that:
For the purposes of this Convention, 
income derived by or through an entity or 
arrangement that is treated as wholly or 
partly fiscally transparent under the tax 
law of either Contracting State shall be 
considered to be income of a resident of a 
Contracting State but only to the extent 
that the income is treated, for purposes of 
taxation by that State, as the income of a 
resident of that State.
This provision is mirrored in the (optional28) 
article 3(1) of the MLI.29 Accordingly, P is entitled 
to treaty benefits only to the extent State P treats it 
as a resident taxpayer to whom income is 
allocated for tax purposes. Consequently, the 
royalty income is taxable only in State P.
Next, the question arises whether State R can 
tax X on the royalty income, even if exclusive 
taxation of royalties vests with State P under 
article 12 of the tax treaty. As discussed 
previously, most OECD member states follow the 
opinion that nothing in the treaty prevents State R 
from taxing X, its own resident. However, the 
OECD proposed the saving clause in the MLI to 
bring clarity to the situation. Nevertheless, if 
states reserve their right and do not opt for the 
saving clause, the MLI provides that states who 
opt to apply article 3(1) should add the following 
sentence at the end of the anti-hybrid provision: 
“In no case shall the provisions of this paragraph 
be construed to affect a Contracting Jurisdiction’s 
right to tax the residents of that Contracting 
Jurisdiction.”30 By inserting this limited version of 
the saving clause, the OECD wishes to ensure that 
the tax treaty cannot prevent State R from taxing 
its own resident, Partner X, even if the treaty 
allocates taxing rights on the royalty income to 
State P.
This prompts another question: Should State 
R should provide relief to partner X (via a credit 
or exemption) for the taxes paid by an opaque 
partnership in State P? In the partnership report, 
the OECD states that relief should be provided.31 
However, in the action 6 report, after discussing 
24
OECD commentary, supra note 13, at article 24, paras. 74 and 79. See 
also 2011 U.N. commentary, supra note 13, article 1, para. 68.
25
For example, see the reservations made to the nondiscrimination 
article of the OECD model by Canada and New Zealand. OECD 
commentary, supra note 13, at article 24, para. 85.
26
For example, see the reservations made to the nondiscrimination 
article of the OECD model by France. Id. at article 24, para. 91.
27
OECD, “Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements, Action 2 — 2015 Final Report,” Chapter 14 (Oct. 5, 2015). 
See also Dhruv Sanghavi, “BEPS Hybrid Entities Proposal: A Slippery 
Slope, Especially for Developing Countries,” Tax Notes Int’l, Jan. 23, 2017, 
p. 357 (arguing that the anti-hybrid clause fails to achieve the goals of the 
BEPS project and thus is an undesirable provision).
28
MLI, supra note 4, at article 3(5)(a).
29
Id. at article 3(1).
30
MLI, supra note 4, at article 3(3).
31
OECD partnership report, supra note 18, at para. 129 (discussion in 
Example 16) and para. 139 (discussion in Example 18).
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the saving clause, the OECD argues otherwise 
and proposes amending article 23 to clarify that 
“both States are not reciprocally obliged to 
provide relief for each other’s tax levied 
exclusively on the basis of the residence of the 
taxpayer.”32 The amended article 23 is also 
reflected in article 3(2) of the MLI.33 However, 
even if states apply article 3(1) and article 3(3), 
states may reserve their right to apply article 
3(2).34 What happens in this situation? Can 
arguments still be made that the partnership 
report principles apply and hence State R should 
provide relief for the taxes paid by the 
partnership? In my opinion, this creates confusion 
and could raise relief-related issues when dealing 
with hybrid entities.
If states adopt both the anti-hybrid clause and 
the saving clause, another issue arises with CFC-
type rules that follow a transparency approach 
(versus a deemed dividend approach). The 
question is whether the CFC rules fall within the 
scope of article 3(1), thus restricting the source 
state from applying its domestic taxing 
provisions. For example, suppose X, a controlling 
shareholder resident in State R, has an interest in 
P, a CFC established in State P. P derives dividend 
income from State S. From the perspective of State 
S and State P, P is a taxable entity. However, State 
R applies its CFC rule and, following a 
transparency approach, treats P as fiscally 
transparent, imputing the dividend income to X. 
All three states incorporate the anti-hybrid 
provision and the saving clause suggested by the 
MLI. Let’s assume that the R-S treaty provides that 
dividends are taxed at a zero rate in the state of 
source while the P-S treaty provides for a tax rate 
at source of 15 percent. There is no doubt that 
State R can tax X on the income; the saving clause 
crystalizes this position. The key question from a 
State S perspective is whether it should be 
restricted to a zero rate or if it can apply the 15 
percent rate. Applying article 3(1), State S should 
be restricted because the income is “derived by or 
through an entity or arrangement that is treated as 
wholly or partly fiscally transparent under the tax 
law” of State R since State R considers the 
dividend to be “the income of a resident of that 
State,” that is, X. The position is strengthened by 
example 9 of the OECD partnership report,35 
which also suggests that State S should be 
restricted to a zero rate because this is a case of 
double treaty entitlement. However, the OECD 
has analyzed the same issue in the context of CFC 
rules that follow a transparency approach and has 
concluded otherwise.36 Why does the OECD have 
two different positions for similar situations? 
From a policy perspective, different treatment of 
similar situations is not desirable.
The Scope of the Saving Clause
Finally, the scope of the exceptions in the MLI 
might be broader than the scope of the exceptions 
provided by article 1(5) of the U.S. model. 
Suppose X, an individual tax resident of State R, 
owns a building in State S from which he derives 
rental income. Assume that article 6, the provision 
regarding immovable property, in the R-S tax 
treaty grants exclusive taxing rights on rental 
income to State S (versus a shared taxing right). If 
the saving clause in the R-S treaty resembles the 
U.S. saving clause, State R would be able to tax X 
(its own resident) because the article dealing with 
immovable property (article 6) is not listed as an 
exception to the clause. However, if the R-S treaty 
uses a clause similar to that in the MLI, then State 
R would not be able to tax its own resident, X. This 
is because subparagraph (j) excepts provisions 
that provide “expressly that the Contracting 
Jurisdiction in which an item of income arises has 
the exclusive right to tax that item of income.”37 
Although this exception makes perfect sense, I 
think it is worth noting that subparagraph (j) to 
article 11 enlarges the scope of the exceptions to 
the saving clause in the MLI beyond that provided 
by the U.S. model.
Conclusion
As demonstrated, a majority of OECD 
member states are of the opinion that tax treaties 
32
OECD action 6 report, supra note 3, at para. 64.
33
MLI, supra note 3, at article 3(2).
34
Id. at article 3(5)(f).
35
OECD partnership report, supra note 18, at para. 74 (discussion in 
Example 9); OECD commentary, supra note 13, at article 1, para. 6.5.
36
OECD base companies report, supra note 15, at para. 59.
37
MLI, supra note 4, at article 11(1)(j).
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do not restrict a state from applying CFC-type 
rules or residence state income attribution rules 
(specifically, regarding partnerships).38 
Accordingly, these states have no need for the 
saving clause.
If the OECD’s key intention with the saving 
clause was to clarify that tax treaties do not 
prevent the application of residence state 
domestic antiavoidance rules such as CFC-type 
rules, I believe that simpler solutions could have 
been proposed instead of a complex saving 
clause. For instance, a treaty provision could 
provide that “Nothing in this Convention shall be 
construed as preventing a Contracting State from 
including in the income of a resident of that 
Contracting State amounts under controlled 
foreign entity type legislation or general anti-
avoidance rules.” A reference to general 
antiavoidance rules (judicial or statutory) is made 
as those rules may also impute the income of 
nonresident entities to resident taxpayers.
If the OECD’s intention was to clarify that 
treaties do not prevent a residence state from 
applying its attribution rules to hybrid entities, 
the aforementioned provision could be 
supplemented by a second sentence stating that 
“This provision also applies to entities in which a 
resident of a Contracting State has an interest such 
as a partnership, trust, or a similar entity.”
Of course, these provisions could lead to 
double taxation. Accordingly, suitable treaty 
provisions would need to be designed to ensure 
that relief from double taxation is provided to 
taxpayers, especially, in cases of residence-
residence conflicts.39  
38
In my opinion, the provisions of a tax treaty do not restrict a state 
from applying CFC-type rules to its own residents.
39
For a discussion on these conflicts, see Robert Danon, 
“Qualification of Taxable Entities and Treaty Protection,” Bulletin for 
International Taxation 192-201 (Apr./May 2014).
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